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1 
 
Apparently it’s not easy to be a rhetorician these days, at least not 
one affiliated with the National Communication Association (NCA) 
or its member departments of communication.  So it would seem 
from reactions to my review of Gross and Keith’s Rhetorical 
Hermeneutics1 by four of rhetoric’s preeminent scholars:  William 
Keith, Steve Fuller, Alan Gross, and Michael Leff.2  NCA-affiliated 
rhetoric, as they see it, is under threat from within and without the 
field of communication studies.3  That my review should have been 
singled out for their expression of disciplinary angst stems 
apparently from my enthusiasm for rhetoric’s increasing 
globalization and for my failure to appreciate how that intellectual 
movement further undermines NCA-rhetoric’s already weakened 
position relative to its real and imagined rivals.  But much that I 
had to say in the review essay in support of a globalized conception 
of rhetoric and of an expanded role for civically oriented 
rhetoricians goes unaddressed by my colleagues.  Of central 
concern to them are issues of turf.  Here are two key quotations: 
 
 
 
 
Turf issues are where the conceptual commitment to 
the globalism of rhetoric bumps into the institutional 
reality that there is only so much money, resources 
and intellectual credit to go around, and we’ll have 
trouble claiming our share if we can’t do better than to 
say we’re part of this wonderful, subtle, intellectual 
project.  Prof. Simons likes to think that sociologists, 
e.g., are “doing rhetoric.” Alright, then, why should 
anyone pay us to do it?4 
 
 
 
 
And again: 
 
 
 
 
Currently “Communication Departments” are 
increasingly dominated by social scientists and their 
courses of study; there’s nothing wrong with that, 
except that this is the very moment when the 
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cheerleaders of rhetoric are declaring that “By God, 
rhetoric is in great shape” because people in other 
fields are using the term.  In other words, just at the 
point when, institutionally, rhetoricians in Speech 
Communication departments need to be working to 
re-assert or re-integrate themselves with their own 
discipline, they focus the attention on imaginary allies 
in other fields.  Yet is Bruno Latour likely to cite, let 
alone hire, Herb Simons or anyone else with a Ph.D. 
in Speech Communication?  None of this ally-
mongering is going to help show that the rhetorical 
tradition is a crucial part of Speech Communication 
programs focused on interpersonal and organizational 
communication, or programs which see the future of 
communication criticism in “cultural studies.”5 
 
2 
 
The issues surrounding rhetoric’s globalization and its 
implications for NCA-affiliated rhetoricians have deep personal 
meaning for me, as they must for those who signed on to “A 
Response to Simons.”  I was a convert to rhetorical studies, having 
begun my career in the now fashionable field of organizational 
communication.  By 1970, I was strongly identified with the 
movement within Speech Communication toward a globalized 
rhetoric, having served as a principal contributor to the NEH-
sponsored task force on “The Advancement and Refinement of 
Rhetorical Criticism,” which recommended an expansion of 
rhetoric’s scope well beyond the civic arena.6  In the eighties I 
attended and coordinated conferences on Burkean rhetorical 
theory and on the rhetoric of inquiry, both of which figure 
prominently in what today is called rhetoric’s globalization.  
Finally, I am by no means detached from the turf battles of which 
Keith et al. speak, although I come at them very differently 
 
 
 
 Why Globalize?  
 
3 
 
In the Chronicle of Higher Education,   Scott McLemee recently 
announced the formation of an “Alliance of Rhetorical Societies” 
with the title “Making it Big.”  Its formation in my view is yet 
another indication of the value of a globalized, interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of rhetoric.  Beginning around 1970, 
suggests McLemee, the globalized approach triggered renewed 
interest in rhetorical scholarship. 
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Literary theorists began rediscovering the classical 
rhetorical tradition, which had analyzed varieties of 
figurative language well beyond the usual categories of 
metaphor and metonymy.  Scholars working in the 
field known as “rhetoric of inquiry” began analyzing 
the ways in which persuasive arguments are 
constructed within specialized fields of study, 
including the natural and social sciences.  And the 
power of mass media fueled efforts to understand the 
forms of persuasion peculiar to visual and electronic 
communication.  In a now-classic essay called “The 
Rhetoric of the Image,” for example, Roland Barthes 
submitted a magazine advertisement for a brand of 
spaghetti to “a spectral analysis of the images it may 
contain.”7 
 
 
 
 
No one who wishes to assess the costs and benefits of rhetoric’s 
move toward globalization can do better than to read Dilip 
Gaonkar’s “Rhetoric and Its Double.”8  There Gaonkar offers a 
balanced assessment, but one that shares my overall enthusiasm 
for the “turn” toward globalization.  Gaonkar is far less sanguine 
about globalization in Rhetorical Hermeneutics, the object of my 
initial critique.  What prompted his initial enthusiasm? 
 
 
4 
 
In “Rhetoric and its Double , Gaonkar features one theorist, 
Kenneth Burke, and one intellectual movement, rhetoric of 
inquiry, as twin pillars of rhetoric’s globalization.  To Burke alone, 
Gaonkar credits the “reclamation” of rhetoric’s long repressed 
sophistic affinities, involving an extension of the range of rhetoric, 
which he finds “perfectly legitimate.”9  The second half of Burke’s 
essay on “Traditional Principles of Rhetoric” breaks with the 
classical notion of clear persuasive intent to discover hidden 
historical treasures.  “Once we come to Bentham’s Book of 
Fallacies, a dazzling intellectual journey begins, a veritable tour de 
force through the history of ideas, involving text upon text, in the 
same breadth speaking of Pascal and Joyce.”10  Thus does Burke 
discover the rich rhetorical elements that, in Burke’s words, “‘had 
become obscured when rhetoric as a term fell into disuse.’”11 
 
 
5 
 
To be sure, Gaonkar, an astute rhetorical analyst of rhetorical 
theory, finds something “occluded” in Burke’s discovery of a neo-
sophistic tradition of rhetoric, hidden behind rhetoric’s “manifest” 
tradition.  This is the tradition of “civic humanism that stretches 
from Protagoras through Isocrates and Cicero to the Renaissance 
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humanists, and continues to manifest itself in the activities of great 
orators like Edmund Burke.”12 
 
6 
 
But the Kenneth Burke, who wrote “Poetic Categories” and “The 
Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle,’” was himself a civic humanist, himself 
a “republican” in the Isocratean sense of that term.13  In such 
essays, he displayed another mark of rhetorical globalism:  its 
impulse to transgress conventional boundaries:  between poetics 
and politics, religion and politics, etc.  In doing so, he 
encompassed and transcended them.  This set up the conditions 
for comparative rhetorical scholarship, which Gaonkar praises in 
Burke’s readings of Pascal and Joyce.  In this sense, Burke’s own 
civic humanism is not a thing apart from his globalization of 
rhetoric.  His move toward “politicizing” poetic categories is itself a 
turn away from – or a step beyond – the “manifest” rhetorical 
tradition.  In “Hitler’s ‘Battle,’” Burke identified not just a pattern 
distinctive to Mein Kampf, but something more global:  on the 
order of a rhetorical genre or what John Lyne calls “a rhetoric, a 
discourse strategy spanning and organizing numerous 
discourses, and acting as a trajectory for discourses yet 
unorganized.”14  (Might Burke have analyzed the Bush 
administration’s rhetoric of a “war on terrorism” in similar terms?) 
 
 
7 
 
My point is that the globalization of rhetoric need not be seen as 
incompatible with civic humanism, certainly not in Burke.  And 
Gaonkar further strengthens the case for rhetoric’s globalization by 
pointing to the many contemporary intellectual movements – in 
history and philosophy of science, in literary studies, in the 
interpretive social sciences – that display a “decisively rhetorical 
orientation.”15  This means, says Gaonkar, “that the special 
sciences are becoming increasingly rhetorically self-conscious.  
They are beginning to recognize that their discourses . . . contain 
an unavoidable rhetorical component.”16 
 
 
8 
 
This alone would seem to me to justify rhetoric’s current state of 
globalization.  It also points the way to an even larger educational 
mission:  moving the special sciences (as Gaonkar calls them) 
beyond their initial flirtations with rhetoric to more explicit, more 
systematic, more thoroughly developed rhetorical conceptions of 
what they are about.  With that must come, of course, testing the 
limits of various globalized perspectives on rhetoric.  The need is 
to determine when a perspective becomes, in Burke’s famous 
phrase, “rotten with perfection.”   And as these limits are tested, 
new perspectives will be needed – and perspectives on those 
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perspectives – in the spirit of Burke’s dialectics. 
 
9 
 
These, as I understand them, are already among the central tasks 
of the Project on Rhetoric of Inquiry and the intellectual 
movement that it has done so much to nurture.  Ironically, as 
Gaonkar observed in “Rhetoric and Its Double,” relatively implicit 
rhetorical theorizing has tended to be more provocative than the 
more explicit rhetorical turn of self-styled rhetorical critics, even 
though they self-consciously use rhetoric as a critical and 
interpretive method.  Compare, for example, Thomas Kuhn’s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions to Wayne Booth’s Rhetoric of 
Fiction.17  The situation would seem to call for interaction between 
the two – precisely what began in earnest with the Iowa 
Symposium on the Rhetoric of the Human Sciences. 
 
 
10 
 
Gaonkar argues that there is something inherently limiting about 
the move toward an explicit rhetorical turn.  But there is category 
slippage here, a conflation of implicit rhetorical theorizing with 
grandiosity or imagination and of explicit rhetorical theorizing 
with sheer obviousness. Gaonkar never showed that this was 
necessarily the case.  Nor am I convinced that what has been most 
grandiose in the implicit rhetorical turn – its attempted 
deconstruction of traditional philosophy’s foundationalist and 
objectivist presuppositions – ought to be the stopping point for the 
rhetorical turn.  Needed beyond the deconstructive rhetorical turn 
is a reconstructive rhetoric, at once skeptical and pragmatic. 
 
 
11 
 
These, however, are quarrels with a colleague fundamentally 
sympathetic to the rhetorical turn.  In “Rhetoric and Its Double,” 
Gaonkar supports the rhetorical turn’s rediscovery of a long 
repressed sophistic tradition and its efforts at moving that 
tradition forward.  In “The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of 
Science” (IRRS), however, Gaonkar moves from fundamental 
sympathy to disciplinary anxiety.  His anxiety erupts into 
something on the order of a panic attack in “A Response to 
Simons.” 
 
 
 
 A Response to “A Response to Simons”  
 
12 
 
In this essay, I discuss the future of rhetoric-as-discipline, with 
special attention to the concerns raised by Keith and others.  I offer 
an inclusive vision of the discipline as a communal dwelling-place, 
open to all comers, and concerned less with property rights or with 
disciplinary consequences than with quality of product.18  
Rhetoric-as-discipline, I argue, is most productively understood as 
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a collective haunt or abode that responds to the call of disciplinary 
responsibility and not simply to issues of turf and power.  It is a 
site of shared commitment to the quest for knowledge and 
wisdom, from which, as a byproduct of its collective effort, a 
discipline may come to develop a reputation for cognitive or moral 
authority, akin to the familiar Aristotelian sense of ethos as 
personal character. 
 
13 
 
To be sure, the preoccupation with turf by many NCA-affiliated 
rhetoricians, the sense of embattlement, and the fear of further 
marginalization are all understandable.  Many a discipline, 
rhetoric more than most, has had to rally its troops in behalf of 
claims to its legitimacy.19  But a discipline’s primary obligation is 
to demonstrate that it has something distinctive and worthwhile to 
contribute to the larger society, not that its own fortunes will be 
advanced if others take it seriously. 
 
 
14 
 
This rule applies to efforts both at forging a disciplinary identity 
and at claims-making bearing on issues of disciplinary ownership 
and centrality.  Paradoxically the weaker the reputation of a 
putative discipline, the greater its need to assert its cognitive or 
moral authority.  But the more forcefully it asserts its authority, 
the more it betrays its disciplinary insecurity.20  Likewise the more 
fragile one’s hold on a discipline, the greater must one’s efforts be 
to claim disciplinary centrality.  Yet the more forcefully one asserts 
that centrality, the more vulnerable one becomes to charges of self-
aggrandizement. 
 
 
15 
 
Precisely this problem afflicts “A Response to Simons.”  Written as 
though it had been submitted to a trade magazine rather than to a 
scholarly journal, it speaks only to NCA-affiliated rhetoricians and 
ultimately does them a disservice by arguing from a position of 
self-admitted weakness in a consistently strident, aggressive tone, 
all the while failing to identify NCA-rhetoric’s very real disciplinary 
strengths.  Worst sin of all, then, for a rhetorician, it is rhetorically 
inept. 
 
 
 
 Questions of Turf  
 
16 
 
An underlying problem may be that NCA-affiliated rhetoric has 
long been committed to a myth of disciplinary centrality that is 
increasingly difficult to sustain.  As recounted by Leff, it is the 
myth of Speech as the sole disciplinary residence of rhetoric for 
much of the twentieth century.   Said Leff, the “poor waif named 
rhetoric . . . had been banished from Europe and had found an 
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academic home only in a new and unstable fiefdom known as the 
American Department of Speech.”21  It is only within the 
framework of this master narrative that one can understand the 
historical accounts provided by Gaonkar in his flagship essay for 
Rhetorical Hermeneutics, “The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of 
Science” (IRRS).  By Gaonkar’s reckoning, rhetorical criticism 
begins with Wicheln’s “inaugural essay” and continues from Black 
to Leff; similarly, contemporary rhetorical theory has moved from 
“Bryant through Bitzer to Farrell.”22 
 
17 
 
I mean no disrespect to my colleagues in suggesting that the story 
told by Leff and filled in by Gaonkar leaves unexplained the rebirth 
of rhetoric in Europe and in Departments of English within the 
United States.  Moreover, as both have acknowledged, the 
rhetorical turn applied to scholarly inquiry (rhetoric of science 
included) is spread across a dozen or more disciplines.  As I argued 
in my critique of IRRS, too much that the wider scholarly world 
credits to contemporary rhetorical theory, criticism, and pedagogy 
falls outside NCA for the myth of NCA-rhetoric’s centrality to be 
sustained.  Indeed even the three NCA-affiliated authors of 
Current Perspectives on Rhetoric offer separate chapters on 
“outsiders” to NCA-rhetoric, none to “insiders.”  Included are 
Richards, Weaver, Toulmin, Perelman, Grassi, Burke, Foucault, 
and Habermas.  And, as I argued in my review, these authors could 
have also devoted chapters to Barthes, Booth, de Man, Fish, 
Kennedy, McCloskey, McKeon, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Vickers, 
and James Boyd White – again excluding anyone  reared in or 
directly affiliated with NCA.23 
 
 
18 
 
Let us return, then, to the substantive issues that should have been 
addressed in “A Response to Simons.”  Gross and Keith had 
claimed in their introduction to Rhetorical Hermeneutics that 
Gaonkar’s arguments would be so intellectually coercive as to 
prevent a broad constituency of scholars from continuing to work 
in their usual ways.24  But in my review of Rhetorical 
Hermeneutics, I called attention to fallacies, inconsistencies, and 
lack of evidence by Gaonkar for sweeping generalizations. 
 
 
19 
 
These problems were not insubstantial, and hence I want to take 
the liberty of repeating them here.  Gaonkar, I maintained, had 
built his critique of a globalized, hermeneutically oriented rhetoric 
on an infirm foundation.  The entire argument was like a house of 
cards, poorly supported at each stage of its flimsy construction and 
hence highly vulnerable to collapse.  Key terms such as 
“translatability” and “thin vocabulary” had been left vague or 
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ambiguous, while key assumptions went undefended.  Among 
these was the assumption that Aristotle’s rhetorical theory – 
indeed an essentialist version of that theory – was central to the 
tasks of rhetorical criticism.25  Another assumption was that 
alleged inadequacies in rhetorical theory’s critical-hermeneutic 
vocabulary were beyond repair.  By these “straw person” 
assumptions, the project of globalization was set up to fail. 
 
20 
 
Gaonkar’s use of rhetoric of science as the test case for “Big 
Rhetoric” was also fallacious in the formal sense, for it assumed 
that failure to meet what was alleged to be the toughest test would 
thereby invalidate the entire globalization project – this through a 
kind of reversal of the a fortiori argument.26  Just why it is that 
Gaonkar was offering these arguments was left somewhat unclear.  
The most obvious explanation is that he had serious misgivings 
about the movement toward globalization, but Gaonkar demurred 
in places.  I charged him with having been systematically 
inconsistent on this issue, and inconsistent too with an earlier, 
prize-winning essay in which he had heaped high praise on 
globalization.  Finally, with naught but a sneer, Gaonkar had 
dismissed neo-Aristotelian and Burkeian rhetorical criticism as 
unproductive and rhetoric of science as “stalled.”  John Angus 
Campbell credited Gaonkar’s “signature substitution of assertion 
and pure pose for argument as admirable.”27  I did not.28 
 
 
 
 Faulty Logics  
 
21 
 
Indeed I confess to having been disappointed with IRRS and 
another entry by Gaonkar, as with the sycophantic readings of 
them by several contributors to Gross and Keith’s Rhetorical 
Hermeneutics.  Hence I had hoped to find in “A Response to 
Simons” some acknowledgment of the merits of my arguments; 
either that or a spirited rebuttal.  But, confronted with my critique, 
Keith and company shifted to what Cherwitz and Hikins have aptly 
called “the argument from disciplinary consequence.”  That is, they 
turned away from the veracity of my claims, focusing instead on 
their disciplinary consequences.29  “We have no desire,” said Keith 
et al., “to perpetuate a dispute about who has sufficient proof to 
support this or that claim.  Instead, believing that Simons’s anger 
is misdirected, we want to stress the importance of the issues that 
Gaonkar raises for our disciplinary self-understanding.”30 
 
 
22 
 
In shifting ground, as they did, Keith et al. mistakenly assumed 
that my critique of  Gaonkar in Rhetorical Hermeneutics was 
irrelevant to our disciplinary self-understanding.  They  
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compounded this error by failing to look beyond rhetoric’s 
globalization for problems with rhetoric’s critical-hermeneutic 
vocabulary and by begging the question as to whether a globalized 
rhetoric must of necessity be “incoherent,” “watered down,” a 
rhetorical scholarship incapable of growth. 
 
23 
 
A recurring argument in IRRS and in the “Response to Simons” is 
that a globalized rhetoric trivializes rhetorical scholarship.  Said 
Keith and company, “If everything is rhetoric/rhetorical, then it is 
neither informative nor interesting [to] be told that a 
practice/discourse/institution is rhetorical.  Si Omnia, nulla.  [If 
everything, nothing.]”31  But this claim conflates “being told” that a 
given act or artifact or discourse formation is rhetorical (at best a 
useful first step) with being shown how it functions rhetorically 
and why that is important.  Merely asserting, for example, that 
placebo treatments persuade (i.e., are rhetorical) is no longer 
newsworthy, if it ever was.  But viewing the placebo treatment as a 
rhetorical genre, exploring its “staging” in medicine or 
psychotherapy as a kind of sham realism, considering thereby the 
relationship between the rhetorical and the real or ostensibly real, 
examining the delegitimating effects of placebo treatments in 
research that succeed too well, and the “public relations” efforts of 
health professions that seek to explain them away:  all this can 
make of the proverbial sugar pill a rich resource for rhetorical 
inquiry.32  Just so with other recent objects of rhetorical inquiry, 
such as claims-making by biologists about the discovery of new 
species.  Alan Gross’s own work on “Taxonomic Language” as 
applied to species identification provides a splendid example of the 
perspectives by incongruity that a globalized approach to rhetoric 
makes possible.33 
 
 
24 
 
Says Edward Schiappa in his own response to critiques of Big 
Rhetoric, “To define a term broadly does not necessarily make the 
term meaningless or useless.  What is significant about the 
rhetorical turn is not that everything is ‘rhetoric,’ but that a 
rhetorical perspective and vocabulary potentially can be used to 
describe a wide variety of phenomena.  Why is this such a bad 
thing?”34  Why indeed?  If it is bad, Gross must surely be among 
the worst offenders, for his essay on species identification aims at 
reconstructing  the central concepts of evolutionary taxonomy 
“rhetorically, without remainder.”35  Schiappa likens the rhetorical 
perspective to efforts by presocratic philosophers to redescribe the 
world in physical rather than religious terms:  “Now, 2600 years 
later, most of the sciences are still informed by the general notion 
that almost everything can be described as “physical.”  Where is 
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the problem?  When was “physics” ever in danger of losing its 
disciplinary authority?”36 
 
25 
 
Far from trivializing rhetorical scholarship, the globalization of 
rhetoric has earned it  a place at several academic tables, including 
science studies, culture studies, legal studies, media criticism, 
literary criticism, ideology critique,  news journalism, 
photojournalism, organizational communication, religion, and 
psychotherapy.37  The rhetorical turn is part and parcel of what 
Clifford Geertz has called the “reconfiguration of social thought,” 
involving a “sea-change” in “the way we think about how we 
think,” from the dominance of technology metaphors to those of 
game, text, drama, and others drawn from the humanities.38 
 
 
26 
 
Here the sophistic influence has been prominent, as Leff has 
noted.39  Indeed the contemporary challenges to traditional 
philosophy by relativists, social constructionists, and postmodern 
skeptics can usefully be recast as a continuation of the debate over 
philosophy versus rhetoric between Plato and the sophists of 
ancient Greece.40  The sophistic influence is at work, for example, 
in critiques of traditional philosophy as engaging in a recurrent 
pattern of question-begging about its own taken-for-granted 
assumptions.  It is work as well in neo-sophistic challenges to the 
objectivist and foundationalist presuppositions of traditional 
philosophy, leaving open the possibility of viewing much of 
scholarly inquiry as involving rhetorical ways of  coming to 
judgment and of bringing others to those judgments.  Ironically 
this ostensible gain for rhetoric is at the heart of Keith et al.’s 
lament.  All would be well if only the major contributions to the 
“rhetorical return” had come from NCA-affiliated rhetoricians.  
But the principal contributors – those like Stanley Fish, B.H. 
Smith, and J.B. White – have come from outside the fold, and they 
have not been particularly prone to cite NCA-affiliated scholarship 
or to draw upon the lexicon of classical terms which Keith and 
others maintained was central to rhetoric’s claim to disciplinary 
distinctiveness. 
 
 
27 
 
How important is it that rhetoricians employ the classical lexicon 
in their scholarship?  Should NCA-affiliated rhetoricians take 
pains to introduce the classical tradition’s distinctive rhetorical 
vocabulary into their teaching?41  I posed these and related 
questions at the 2002 NCA convention in New Orleans to Edward 
Schiappa, Robert Ivie, and David Zarefsky – not a representative 
sample, but an impressive one – all of whom agreed to go on the 
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record.42 
 
28 
 
As regards specific terms in the rhetorical lexicon, Schiappa is a 
pragmatist, or, as he put it, a “terminological Darwinist.”  “We use 
vocabularies that work for us, that accomplish our ends; and if 
there are other terms that work better for some reason, so be it.  
Disciplines progress (for the most part) through greater 
specialization, and that specialization usually entails a richer and 
more technical vocabulary.  If the language of classical rhetoric no 
longer does what we need it to do, or if other language works 
better, again, so be it.” 
 
 
29 
 
Like Schiappa, Ivie finds himself using explicitly rhetorical terms 
selectively, seeking to “avoid an overly jargonized fetish with our 
field’s ‘technical’ terms but also trying to take advantage of their 
heuristic value for engaging in rhetorical critique of public culture.  
Often the terms I draw upon – tropes such as metaphor and 
metonymy – are in broader use already across disciplines and thus 
not subject to disciplinary parochialism.”  Ivie adds: 
 
 
 
 
Insofar as the question is what we teach, I think it is 
very important to expose students to the body of 
rhetorical theory from pre-modern, classical times 
through post-modern adaptations.  I teach a graduate 
course on Vico-Nietzsche-Perelman-Burke, for 
example, to give students a strong intellectual 
background in rhetorical approaches to cultural 
production that are explicitly an alternative to the 
high modernist diminishment of rhetoric.  My attitude 
is to engage other discourses that share a rhetorical 
sensitivity, in a broad sense, neither giving up my 
specifically rhetorical heuristics nor insisting 
exclusively on their articulation in the classical 
tradition.  I think of Kenneth Burke as an example of 
someone who recovered the rhetorical tradition for 
contemporary use, not only bringing back the 
language of persuasion for studying the dynamic of 
social division and identification but also drawing into 
that tradition terminologies that had been invented in 
other disciplines. 
 
 
30 
 
David Zarefsky allows that he sometimes refrained from use of the 
rhetorical lexicon in his scholarship so as to reach a wider 
audience.  He has much the same policy as regards teaching in a 
professional Master’s degree program (as opposed to teaching his 
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own majors).  He says: 
 
 
 
In my opinion it is the quality of our insight and not 
our technical vocabulary on which we ultimately will 
stand or fall.  I would rather engage in dialogue with 
historians and political scientists than isolate myself 
by technical vocabulary.  This does not mean that I am 
afraid of using rhetorical terms and concepts, and I do 
so when I think it helps understanding.  But, in my 
opinion, what wins legitimacy for our discipline is the 
recognition by others that our scholars have 
something important and distinctive to say.  I think it 
is our rich explication of the relationship between 
texts and contexts, not our distinctive vocabulary, that 
enables us to do that. 
 
 
 
 
But, if what matters most is rhetorical sensitivity, or an ability to 
explicate relationships between texts and contexts, then 
“outsiders” who never imagined themselves to be rhetoricians 
might be able to do as well.  Zarefsky was inclined to agree.  This 
brings us back to the concerns expressed by Keith and company, 
calling into question their protectionist logic. 
 
 
 
 Looking to the Future  
 
31 
 
Like any academic tradition, rhetoric-as-discipline is in perpetual 
need of renewal and reinvention.  This may in turn require 
rhetorical sensitivity to new kinds of texts and to changing 
contexts, as well as a readiness to abandon old terms and old 
understandings of terms for newer, more serviceable ones.  
Disciplinary lexicons are important, but there is little reason to 
believe that the Darwinian process of which Schiappa speaks is 
more likely to be advanced by pulling in the conceptual wagons. 
 Consider the alternative possibility:  that enrichment of the 
“critical-hermeneutic” vocabulary and eventual disambiguation 
might accrue from broader usage and from commerce with other 
fields – from free trade rather than protectionism.  A fine example 
of terminological enrichment is Gaonkar’s forum for the Quarterly 
Journal of Speech in November of 2002 on the idea of the 
“public,” featuring, as it happens, an English professor rather than 
a rhetorician associated with NCA or a department of 
communication.  The Michael Warner piece provides a model of 
the management of conceptual ambiguity, gained by a 
combination of broad application and precise delineation.43 
 
Herbert W. Simons 54 Poroi, 2, 2, November, 2003 
 
32 
 
In reviewing Rhetorical Hermeneutics, I offered a number of 
constructive suggestions on the implications of taking rhetorical 
globalization seriously.  One of these was that we in speech 
communication become shameless borrowers of concepts and 
theories from others, while at the same time making it difficult if 
not impossible for them to ignore our contributions.  We should, 
for example, represent the best work on a topic, from whatever 
origins, and not simply cite in our journal articles or include in our 
anthologies only NCA-affiliated rhetorical scholarship.44  We 
should also introduce our graduate students to controversies about 
rhetoric in other disciplines, such as debates within philosophy 
and the social sciences about rhetoric’s role in the social 
construction of reality.45  Too often we NCA-affiliated rhetoricians 
ignore disputes, such as between strict constructionists and 
contextual constructionists,” that ought to occupy a central place 
in our theorizing and research.46  These and other such 
suggestions are dismissed by Keith et al. as “the warm haze of 
interdisciplinary ambiguity.”47 
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These issues call for coolheaded consideration, rather than curt 
dismissal.  Do we not have an obligation to our students, if not to 
ourselves, to represent the best in rhetorical scholarship, and to 
introduce them to controversies about rhetoric outside our 
immediate field?  One would think that the answers to both these 
questions would be a quick and emphatic yes!  Yet preoccupation 
with disciplinary consequences seems to have been the subtext 
even of Gaonkar’s IRRS essay.  As I remarked in my review of 
Rhetorical Hermeneutics, too much of IRRS is about disciplinary 
recognition, visibility, reputation, status, with “discipline” being 
narrowly defined.  Barely acknowledged were the substantive 
contributions to the rhetoric of science by those “outside the pale” 
– such as Latour and Woolgar or Nelson, Megill, and McCloskey – 
on whom Gaonkar had heaped praise in “Rhetoric and its 
Double.”48 
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In my review, I also put forward a vision for a reinvigorated NCA-
style approach to rhetoric.  Let us prepare our undergraduates, I 
suggested, not just for the career marketplace, but also for the life 
of the mind, and for civic engagement.  Let us do so in ways quite 
familiar to us, yet not always rewarded, for example, by cultivating 
both rudimentary and advanced skills at public speaking, 
discussion, and debate. 
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A potentially useful model is the Temple Issues Forum, including 
its extracurricular student arm, the TIF Debate and Discussion  
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Club.49  Its professionally produced “highlights” video of a day-
long “Bombings and Beyond” forum has been shown at various 
conferences and colloquia.  (It is available for viewing elsewhere.)  
The forum was held just two days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
It featured faculty and students deliberating together on media 
coverage of the attacks, on America’s choices, and on the role of 
the University in times of crisis.  The Debate and Discussion Club 
not only prepares undergraduates to compete in tournament 
events, but also provides instruction via its Public Debate and 
Discussion component on how to organize, stage, and participate 
in public events such as the 9/13 forum.  This is hands-on training 
that alerts the campus to values of rhetoric.  It enlivens the campus 
and provides a counterstatement to university corporatization and 
careerism.  At a recent day-long forum on “Invading Iraq,” the 
Debate and Discussion Club supervised three panel discussions, 
each combining expertise with ideological balance.  Members took 
turns serving as “talk show” moderators.  Here is a model of 
rhetorical pedagogy that other campuses can surely emulate. 
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While providing positive models of rhetoric, however, our field 
needs also to attend to the darker, sophistic side of rhetoric – with 
a view, not to promote it, but to understand and evaluate it 
critically.  Too often that sophistic side is denied or minimized, 
again for the sake of disciplinary legitimacy.  Yet we ignore it to 
society’s peril.  I am thinking, for example, of the ways of 
mystification used to sanitize barbaric practices and to justify 
exploitation and oppression.  Echoing Robert Hariman, I would 
urge a reframing of rhetoric’s long history of marginalization.  The 
idea is to show its downside and demonstrate opportunities to 
draw on its experiences.  Kenneth Burke did that repeatedly – as in 
his analysis of “Hitler’s ‘Battle.’”  Said Hariman, “As rhetoric is 
marginal, it also is a reservoir of power” – a zone of those 
potencies suppressed in our society.”50 
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The arguments for disciplinary consequence put forward in “A 
Response to Simons” are counterproductive.  Its authors betray 
disciplinary insecurity in the interests of claiming disciplinary 
centrality, distract attention from substantive issues much in need 
of attention, and invite the very sorts of unnecessary and 
potentially destructive conflict that they are at pains to denounce. 
 
 
38 
 
Regrettably the authors are by no means alone.  The myth of 
speech as rhetoric’s sole house of residence, its disciplinary center,  
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gets passed on from generation to generation of students, and even 
finds expression in Gaonkar’s disciplinary histories of 
contemporary rhetorical theory and criticism.  The sense of threat 
leads to an us-them orientation and a consequent  pulling in of the 
wagons, prompting even Gaonkar to play down the contributions 
to rhetorical scholarship of those not in the NCA fraternity whom 
he had previously honored. 
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Symptomatic of the deepening malaise is the apparent enmity 
among many NCA-affiliated rhetoricians to cultural studies.  By 
way of explaining the inclusion in the Quarterly Journal of Speech 
of “A Response to Simons,” the editors reported that my essay had 
evoked a considerable response from the QJS readership, 
including a goodly number of “angry rhetors” who also worried 
“that their ancient discipline is being swallowed up by the 
leviathan of cultural studies.”  So caught up were the authors with 
battles real and imagined that they too miscast me as a cultural-
studies groupie.  Where in my fourteen pages of text, I wondered, 
was that written?  Quite the contrary:  I had challenged both the 
necessity and ultimate significance of a principle put forward by 
Gaonkar and generally associated with cultural studies.  This is the 
notion that intentionality is an illusion, that agency is an ideology, 
that everything we might have assumed is individually authored 
(Darwin’s Origin, for example) is really intertextual. 
 
 
40 
 
This is not to say that I am a rhetoric groupie.  What I most regret 
is the pressure from both camps to choose sides.  Much that they 
contribute is complementary or cross-cutting or mutually 
exclusive; very little requires choosing sides.  Cultural studies lack 
traditional rhetoric’s understanding of invention, argument, and 
style.  Rhetoric lacks the understanding of power, including the 
language of power, evident in cultural studies.  Neither is adequate 
for some tasks, such as managing long-term campaigns and 
movements; but the two together are better than either alone for 
other purposes, such as analyzing feminist rhetoric. 
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Why, then, can’t those of us in Communication all get along?  And 
if we must compete, why can’t we display our wares rather than 
our wariness?  This same question can be asked of rhetoricians 
from within and outside the National Communication Association.  
The possibilities for collaboration among NCA-affiliated 
rhetoricians and our rhetorician colleagues in English departments 
have surely been demonstrated at recent Rhetoric Society of 
America conferences, and with no friction whatsoever between 
proponents of “Big Rhetoric” and of a “restrained rhetoric” focused 
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on the civic arena.51  So, too, has it been useful to bring together 
NCA-oriented rhetoricians with rhetorically oriented scholars from 
other fields at Iowa’s symposia on rhetoric of inquiry, as at various 
international conferences on argumentation. 
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All this is to suggest that disciplinary rhetoric requires a hospitable 
disciplinary home (or perhaps more than one!) inviting to 
strangers and with permeable, flexible boundaries.  So, too, must 
we do a better job of making our case to colleagues in other  fields.  
Our disciplinary history – indeed most disciplinary histories – can 
offer few reassurances that we will succeed in turf battles through 
the argument from disciplinary consequence.  We are more likely 
to succeed by responding as best we can to the call of scholarly and 
pedagogical responsibility. 
 
 
 
 
© Herbert W. Simons, 2003. 
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